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ABSTRACT
In this paper we present a novel approach to optimise tactical
and strategic decision making in football (soccer). We model the
game of football as a multi-stage game which is made up from a
Bayesian game to model the pre-match decisions and a stochastic
game to model the in-match state transitions and decisions. Using
this formulation, we propose a method to predict the probability
of game outcomes and the payoffs of team actions. Building upon
this, we develop algorithms to optimise team formation and in-
game tactics with different objectives. Empirical evaluation of our
approach on real-world datasets from 760 matches shows that by
using optimised tactics from our Bayesian and stochastic games,
we can increase a team chances of winning by up to 16.1% and 3.4%
respectively.
1 INTRODUCTION
Many real-world settings can be modelled as games involving a pair
of teams. In these types of games, each team optimises its tactical
decisions to maximise its chances of winning. Examples include
politics where teams of politicians aim to win an election as a party
[23] and defence and security, where teams of agents schedule
their rota to protect a facility against attackers (e.g., Stackelberg
Games [18] and Port Security [21]). In this paper we focus on a
model for games in team sports, specifically on games of Association
Football (soccer).1 The popularity of football has grown significantly
over the last 20 years and is now a huge industry in the world
providing 1 million jobs in the UK alone and entertainment to over
a billion people worldwide. According to a recent report2 in 2018,
the estimated size of the European sports industry is âĆň25.5 billion.
In football, there are two teams (made up of 11 individual play-
ers) who work together to score and prevent goals. Winning a
game involves many tactical decisions, including but not limited
to, assigning positions to players, composing a team, and reacting
to in-game events. Such decisions have to be made against signif-
icant degrees of uncertainty, and often in very dynamic settings.
Prior multi-agents research for football has focused more on the
contribution of individual agents within a team [3, 8]. However, to
date, there is no formal model for the tactical decisions and actions
to improve a team’s probability of winning. There are a number
of tactical decisions that are made both pre-match and during the
1Referred to as just “football” throughout this paper.
2https://www2.deloitte.com/uk/en/pages/press-releases/articles/annual-review-of-
football-finance-2018.html.
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match. These decisions are often just made through subjective opin-
ions and “gut feelings”, and are a popular subject of discussion in
football media.3
Against this background, we propose a formal model for the
game of football and the tactical decisions that are made in the
game. We model the game as a 2-step game that is made up of a
Bayesian game to represent the pre-match tactical decisions that
are made due to the incomplete information regarding the tactical
choices of the opposition. We then use a stochastic game to model
the state-transitions in football and the tactical decisions that can be
made during the match. It is important to note how the decisions in
both the Bayesian and stochastic game feed back into one another
as the pre-match decisions impact the starting strategies during the
game, and the in-game decisions allow us to learn what tactics work
well against certain teams. This formal model allows us to learn the
payoffs of given decisions and actions so that we can optimise the
decisions that are made by a team. We validate and test our model
and algorithms to data from real-world matches. We show that our
pre-match and in-match tactical optimisation can boost a team’s
chances of obtaining a positive result from a game (win or draw).
We also show that we can use machine learning effectively to learn
pre-match probabilities based on tactical decisions and accurately
predict state changes. Thus, this paper advances the state of the art
in the following ways:
(1) We propose a novel mathematical model for the game of
football and the tactical decision-making process.
(2) Using real-world data from 760 real-world football games
from the past two seasons of the English Premier League
(EPL), we can learn the payoffs for different team actions
and learn state transitions. In particular, we show that we
can predict game-state transitions with an accuracy of up
to 90%. We also show we can accurately predict opposition
tactical decisions.
(3) By learning action payoffs, we can optimise pre- and in-
match tactical decisions to improve the probability of win-
ning a game.
When taken together, our results establish benchmarks for a
computational model of football and data-driven tactical decision
making in team sports. Furthermore, our work opens up a new area
of research into the use of these techniques to better understand
how humans make decisions in sport.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we
review the literature on tactics in football. Section 3 formally defines
our model and tactical optimisation. In Sections 4 and 5 we discuss
themethodswe use to optimise decisions for our Bayesian game and
stochastic game respectively. In Section 6 we validate and test our
models using real-world datasets. Finally, in Section 7 we discuss
out results and in Section 8 we conclude.
3https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/50334352.
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2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we review related literature showing applications of
game theory to real-world problems and give an overview of why
football tactics are important and what they involve.
2.1 Related Work
We discuss examples of work that models real-world strategies as
well as work relating to decision making in football.
2.1.1 Modelling Real-world Strategic Interactions: Work in [22]
models the game of Go and makes strategic decisions in the game
using deep neural networks and tree search. Their program (Al-
phaGo) achieved a 99.8% winning rate against other Go programs,
and defeated the human European Go champion by 5 games to 0.
In [24] Bayesian modelling is used to predict the opening strategy
of opposition players in a real-time strategy game. They test their
model on a video game called StarCraft.4 This approach is similar
to how we aim to predict the strategy of the opposition in our
Bayesian game. However, in our approach, we look to take this one
step further and optimise our strategy around the potential strate-
gies and opposition could take and then feed this into a stochastic
game [20]. Other examples of work for opponent modelling are
shown in [5, 6, 13].
There are also examples of strategic models in security. Work in
[18] focuses on Bayesian Stackelberg games, in which the player is
uncertain about the type of the adversary it may face. This paper
presents efficient algorithms using MIP-formulations for the games
and test their approaches on several different patrolling games.
Following on from this there are applications of game theoretic
approaches for security shown in [21]. In this work, the authors
present a game-theoretic system deployed by the United States
Coast Guard in the port of Boston for scheduling their patrols. This
paper shows an example of a model for a real maritime patrolling
problem and test this using real-world data (using mock attacks).
In [7] a model is developed for strategies in two-player stochastic
games with multiple objectives explored for autonomous vehicles
and stopping games. This shows one of the first applications of
multi-objective stochastic two-player games. Another example of
a model for stochastic games is shown in [15] which shows the
use of discounted robust stochastic games in a single server queu-
ing control. Finally, work in [1] models the problem of inventory
control at a retailer formulating the problem as a twoâĂŘperson
nonzeroâĂŘsum stochastic game.
The work in this paper differs from previous work as we use
real-world data for a real-world problem creating a novel model
that can feed optimised strategies from a pre-match Bayesian game
into an in-match stochastic game; to the best of our knowledge, this
is the first time such an intertwining is proposed in the literature.
2.1.2 Decision-Making in Sport: There has also been work in
the sports domain focusing on tactics and looking at game-states
in football. Firstly, work in [14] explores different risk strategies for
play-calling in American Football (NFL). Although game theory has
not been applied to football tactics in prior work, some examples of
key work to understand the game better are shown in [16]. There,
4StarCraft and its expansion StarCraft: Brood War are trademarks of Blizzard
Entertainment
deep imitation learning has been used to “ghost” teams so that
a team can compare the movements of its players to the league
average or the top teams in the league. Also, [11] provides a model
to assess the expected ball possession that each team should have
in a game of football. These papers help to identify where teams
can make changes to their styles of play to improve their tactics.
Another application of learning techniques in football is shown for
fantasy football games in [17].
To give more background around these papers and the problem
we are looking to solve, in the next subsection we give a background
to football tactics and their importance to the game.
2.2 Football Tactics
The foundations of sports and football tactics are discussed in [2,
12] and applications of AI is discussed in [4]. There are multiple
tactical decisions that a coach or manager must make before and
during a game of football. These can have a significant impact on
the overall result of the game and can help boost the chance of
a team winning, even if a team does not have the best players.
It is worth noting that in a standard league (such as the EPL or
La Liga) a win is worth 3 points, a draw 1 point and a loss no
points. Therefore, some teams aim to pick more reserved tactics to
increase their chances of drawing a game which they are unlikely
to win. Managers and coaches prepare for their upcoming matches
tactically to the finest details, usually by using subjective opinions
of their own and opposition team/players. Some of the key pre-game
decisions that are made by both teams include:
• Team Style: A teams playing style is a subjective concept
that relates to the teams overall use of different playing
methods. There are many different styles that a team can use
but these can be analysed using game statistics and similar
styles can be identified. Some examples of these are shown
in Table 1.5
• Team Formation: The formation is how the players are
organised on the pitch. There is always 1 goalkeeper and 10
outfield players who are split into defenders (DEF), midfield-
ers (MID) and forwards (FOR). An example of a formation
is 4-4-2, this represents 4 defenders, 4 midfielders and 2
forwards. Figure 1 shows how this is set up on the pitch
(attacking in the direction of the arrows).
• Selected Players: The selected players are the 11 players
that are selected to play in the given starting formation or
selected to be on the substitute bench (between 5-7 players).
Some playersmay perform better in different styles/formation
or against certain teams.
Style Description
Tika-Taka Attacking play with short passes.
Route One Defensive play with long passes.
High Pressure Attack by pressuring the opposition.
Park The Bus A contained defensive style.
Table 1: Example Playing Styles.
5More styles explained here: https://www.90min.com/posts/2990047-6-very-different-
styles-of-football-from-across-the-world.
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Figure 1: Example Team Formation (4-4-2).
In terms of the in-game decisions that are made, one change
that can be made is with a substitution (other examples include
tweaks to the style and formation). Therefore, we can model the
in-game decisions as a stochastic game and look to make optimised
substitutions that increase the probability of scoring a goal. This
can help teams to improve their chances of winning games and
learn from historic datasets.
Due to the number of decisions that can be made by teams in
football both before and during the match, there are many uncer-
tainties both in what the opponent may do and on how the decisions
made may affect the overall outcome of the game. In this paper,
we aim to address some of these uncertainties so we can optimise
tactical decision-making in football. In the next section, we define
the model we use to achieve this.
3 A FORMAL MODEL FOR THE GAME OF
FOOTBALL
We model the tactical decisions that are made in football into two
parts. First, we model the pre-match tactical decision making pro-
cess as a Bayesian game, taking into account the fact that each team
has incomplete information regarding the opposition’s tactical de-
cisions before the game begins. Second, we model the in-match
decisions as a stochastic game due to changing states of a game of
football as the game progresses (see Section 3.2 for more details on
the states of the game). We use these two as modelling tools and
frameworks to conduct learning in, rather than aiming to solve for
equilibria. This is because ours is a real-world dynamic setting with
multiple sources of uncertainty; and one in which the identity of
the opponents faced by a player changes for every instance of the
game (moreover, the same opponent is met only twice per season).
Thus, solving for some kind of equilibrium of the overall setting is
clearly impractical. By contrast, opponent types and probabilistic
transitions among states that represent scorelines given formation
and style are natural in this problem. As such, our Bayesian and
stochastic game framework provides a natural model to facilitate
learning in this domain.
3.1 Pre-Match Bayesian Game
As discussed in Section 2.2, there are many unknown factors about
the opposition and many decisions that must be made for a team to
maximise their chances of having a positive outcome from a game.
Therefore, we use a Bayesian game to model strategic decisions and
make optimised decisions. In our Bayesian game we define the two
teams as T = {Tα , Tβ } where Tα is the team whose actions we are
optimising and Tβ is the opposing team. Each of these teams has
a corresponding action set Aα and Aβ . These are sets of one-shot
actions selected by both teams, involving tactical choices before
the match (i.e. selecting the team formation is a single decision and
selecting the starting 11 players are 11 separate decisions for each
position). Each individual action/decision is a ∈ A.
There is a set of possible types Θ that a team can select and each
team’s corresponding type is defined as θα and θβ where θ ∈ Θ.
These types correspond to the style of football in which an oppo-
sition is likely to use (e.g., tika-taka, route one and high pressure).
Some other examples of how we can use team types in football
would include: the strength of the team (in terms of league position)
and the difference between home and away teams. We then have a
probability function which represents a teams’ prior beliefs about
the choices of their opposition regarding their style type and the
actions that they may take (in this case it is the probability that
a team will play a given formation). This probability function is
defined as p(Aβ |Θβ ) → R which represents the probability that a
team Tβ will select a given action in the set Aβ (a team formation)
and a style type from the set Θβ .
The payoff function in our game is used to represent the proba-
bility of gaining a positive result from a game based on the selected
actions, as well as the type and prior beliefs of the opposition. We
calculate the probability of a win, draw or loss for a team andweight
these to incorporate the positive results. A win is weighted to 2, a
draw to 1 and a loss to 0 (so we aim to avoid poor results). The pay-
off utility function is then defined as u(aα ,θα |aβ ,θβ )) → R. This
represents the payoff (weighted sum of result probabilities) based
on the teams selected actions (aα ,aβ ) and their style (θα ,θβ ) where
a ∈ A and the type is θ ∈ Θ. We therefore define our Bayesian game
as:
GB = (T ,A,Θ,p,u) (1)
In this game, we assume that both teams do not know the other
teams’ tactics. However, both teams have access to the same as-
sumptions using previous data and knowledge on the likely style
and formation that a team will use. A team looking to maximise
their chances of winning a game would select the action set of
decisions which maximises the payoff function and therefore gives
the greatest probability of winning a game. However, there are
multiple strategies that we can take to optimise the selected deci-
sions depending on the state of the team in real-world (e.g., league
position, fighting relegation, a knock-out cup game etc). Therefore,
we present three approaches to optimising the selected tactics:
• Best Response: maximises the chances of a win (shown in
Equation 2).
max
{ ∑
a1∈Aα
∑
a2∈Aβ
u(a1, θα |a2, θβ ) · p(a2 |θβ )
}
(2)
where, Aα and Aβ are the set of actions that team α and
β can take respectively. We aim to maximise the sum of
payoffs u multiplied by the probability of the opposition (Tβ )
selecting the action a2 and style θβ . This approach has the
highest risk as we are not considering the opposition payoff,
we just select the best payoff for ourselves.
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• Spiteful Approach:minimises the chances of losing a game
(shown in Equation 3).
min
{ ∑
a1∈Aα
∑
a2∈Aβ
u(a2, θβ |a1, θα ) · p(a2 |θβ )
}
(3)
where, we aim to minimise the sum of the payoffs u for the
opposition team multiplied by the probability of the oppo-
sition selecting the action a2 and style θβ . By reducing the
chances of the opposition winning the game, this increases
the chances of a draw or a win for our team. This approach
has the lowest risk as we are not considering our payoff, we
are selecting the payoff that limits the opposition.
• Minmax Approach: In this approach we find the tactics
that maximise the chances of winning the game but also
minimise the chances of the opposition winning a game
(shown in Equation 4).
max
{ ∑
a1∈Aα
∑
a2∈Aβ
(u(a1, θα |a2, θβ ) − u(a2, θβ |a1, θα )) · p(a2 |θβ )
}
(4)
where, we aim to maximise the sum of the payoffsu for team
α while also minimising the sum of the payoffs u for the
opposition team. This is then weighted by the probability of
the opposition selecting the action a2 and style θβ .
The different optimisation approaches allow teams to select the
tactics which are best suited to their risk levels which may be
dependant on the overall position of a team in a league or the
individual game scenario. The pre-match decisions that are made
by the team are then used as their pre-match tactics which feed
into the stochastic game defined next section, where we model
the in-match tactical decisions (such as substitutes) so that we can
optimise the in-match decisions.
3.2 In-Match Stochastic Game
As a game of football progresses the game changes state in-terms
of the scoreline, in-turn changing the objectives for either team.
If a team is winning they may make defensive changes to ensure
they win the game and if a team is losing they may make attacking
changes to get back into the game. Due to these state changes, we
model the in-game tactical decisions as a stochastic game.
In our stochastic game, we define the two teams asT = {Tα ,Tβ }
where Tα is the team whose actions we are optimising and Tβ is
the opposing team. We have a set of states X which represent the
different possible scorelines in a game starting at 0-0 (where the
left number represents the home team goals and the right number
represents the away team goal). Each team has a corresponding
set of strategies Sα (x) and Sβ (x) at each of the different states
x ∈ X . The strategies represent the current team formation, players
and the style of play (the starting strategies are taken from the
Bayesian game defined in the previous section). At the starting
state x0 (0-0) the team strategies (Sα (x0) and Sβ (x0)) correspond to
the selected actions from Aα and Aβ defined in the Bayesian game
in the previous section.
Given the selected strategies of the two teams (s1 ∈ Sα (x) and
s2 ∈ Sβ (x)) and the current state (x ) we can calculate the probability
of a transition to another state x ′. This is defined as π (x ′ |x , s1, s2).
In the case of football, from each state there are only two possible
states that can be moved to. These will be transitioned by a goal for
the home team or a goal for the away team. The other probability
we will have to consider is that the state will not be changed for the
remainder of the match. In this problem, the length of the game (t )
is known (90 minutes + injury time) and therefore the probability
of state changes will change as the remaining time of the game
decreases. The utility function u(x , s1, s2) for this game equates to
the probability of a transition into a more positive state (e.g., a team
scoring in a 0-0 state to move into a 1-0 state or a winning team
(1-0) staying in that state for the remainder of the match time).
Given these definitions, we define our stochastic game as:
GS = (X ,T , S(x),π ,u) (5)
Each team aims to move to a more positive state than they are
currently in, they make decisions to improve the probability of
moving to the more positive state based on their strategy Sα (x).
The state changes based on goals in the game, meaning for a game
ending 0-0 the state will never move, only time t . The example
below in Figure 2 shows the possible transitions in a game with
two goals. We can optimise actions to focus on staying in a positive
state (a win) or aiming to move into a more positive state from the
current state (e.g., a draw into a win or a loss into a draw).
These stochastic games feed back into future Bayesian games.
The future game would have added data to learn from regarding
how the decisions made prior performed against certain teams. The
transitions made due to choices in the stochastic game will help
form beliefs p(Aβ |Θβ ) regarding what pre-game actions (such as
the selected formation) that teams of certain types choose. Also, the
two teams in the games will likely play again in the future (teams
play each other both home and away each season) and therefore
we can learn from our choices and decisions in the first game to
improve on in the next game.
0 − 0
1 − 0 0 − 1
2 − 0 0 − 21 − 1
π1
π 2 π3
π
4
π5
π6
π7
π8
π 9
π10 π11 π12
Figure 2: An example of a state-transition diagram in a match
with 2 goals being scored and the different routes that can be taken
through the states. The highlighted route shows the transitions for
a match ending 2-0 to the home team.
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4 SOLVING THE PRE-MATCH BAYESIAN
GAME
With the defined gameGB from the previous section, we formulate
a model for the pre-match Bayesian game that we solve to select
the best tactics which will maximise a team chances of obtaining a
positive outcome. To do this there are a number of challenges that
we must address. Firstly, we predict the tactics of the opposition by
using historical data from similar games so that we can calculate the
payoffs of different actions against given opposition actions. Next,
we learn the payoff values for the actions that we select and finally
we optimise the selected tactics. This is expanded on throughout
this section.
4.1 Predicting the Opposition Strategy
When predicting how an opposition will select their strategy, there
is limited historical data for games against them in the past. There-
fore, we cluster the teams into different playing style categories so
we can look for trends in how the opposition play against similar
team styles. To cluster the teams we use a feature set containing the
number of: passes, shots, goals for, goals against and tackles that a
team has made. For the clustering we use a k-means approach for
|C | clusters using Equation 6 which aims to choose centroids that
minimise the inertia, or within-cluster sum-of-squares criterion.
n∑
i=0
min
µ j ∈C
(| |xi − µ j | |2) (6)
where, n is the number of teams andC is the set of cluster means µ.
This allows us to evaluate the style of a team, for example a
team with many passes and many shots may be seen as a “tika-
taka” style team which is an attacking team playing a passing style
of football (e.g., the World Cup winning Spain team from 2010 or
Barcelona), whereas a team with fewer passes and defensive play
may have a “route one” style where they look to use long balls over
the opposition defence.
Using the clusters of team styles we can learn the strategies that
an opposition uses against similar teams. To do this we look at the
historical data and build a model using a Support Vector Machine
(SVM) with a radial basis function kernel [19] (shown in Equation
7). The algorithm learns using features x which are made up from
the tactical set-ups from the prior 5 games against teams from the
same style cluster.
f (x) =
C∑
i=1
λiϕ(|x −mi |) (7)
where, C is the clusters,m is the cluster centres and λ is the cluster
weighting.
4.2 Learning the Payoffs
To learn the payoffs from historical data we develop a model that
uses the team’s tactical style, potential formation and team strength
to give probabilities of a team winning the game. The set of fea-
tures (X ) that we use for in our model are: home team style, away
team style, home team formation, away team formation and then
team strengths are calculated by using the outputs from the model
described in [9] (likelihood of a home win, draw or away win). The
target class is the final result of the game: home team win, away
team win or a draw.
Using these features, we train a multi-class classification deep
neural network. The neural network is trained using stochastic
gradient descent using a categorical cross-entropy loss function
(shown in Equation 8) and a soft-max activation function.
− 1
N
N∑
i=1
logpmodel[yi ∈ Oyi ] (8)
where, N is the number of games that we are using to train the
model and pmodel[yi ∈ Oyi ] is the models probability that yi is in
the class O . This model takes the given teams, possible playing
styles and possible formations to give a probability of winning,
drawing or losing the game. Finding and selecting optimised tactics
is discussed in the next subsection.
4.3 Optimising Pre-Match Tactics
Once we have a model that learns the expected payoffs from the
different possible actions (by ourselves and the opposition), we then
look to find the best actions/decisions to make, i.e., those which
maximise the chances of gaining a positive outcome the game.
Firstly, we use the methods that we discuss in Section 4.1 to
predict the actions and style that an opposition is likely to select.
We use the clustering methods to find their most likely tactical style
and then the formation prediction model to give the formation with
the highest probability of being selected. By using the predicted
opposition style and formation, we explore our possible actions to
select the best tactics. Table 2 shows the payoffs for the different
actions that we can take (when facing a given opposition formation
and style). Here, S corresponds to a given style we are able to play in
(x possible styles), f corresponds to a given formation (y possible)
and then p(h,d,a |S, f ) is the probability (output from the model
discussed in Section 4.2) for a home win h, draw d and away win a
given the selected style and formation. The payoff for the team is
the weighted sum of win and draw probabilities and these values are
pre-computed so that we can then use the three approaches defined
in Section 3.1 (best response, spiteful and minmax) to optimise the
tactical decisions that we can take depending on the opposition.
S1 . . . Sx
f1 p(h,d,a |S1, f1) . . . p(h,d,a |Sx , f1)
f2 p(h,d,a |S1, f2) . . . p(h,d,a |Sx , f2)
f3 p(h,d,a |S1, f3) . . . p(h,d,a |Sx , f3)
...
... . . .
...
fy p(h,d,a |S1, fy ) . . . p(h,d,a |Sx , fy )
Table 2: An example payoff table for a teamwho can have a tactical
style of S1 to Sx and a given formation f1 to fy .
5 SOLVING THE IN-MATCH STOCHASTIC
GAME
We compute optimised strategies for our in-match stochastic game
GS by using historical data of the team tactical setups (style and
formation as discussed in the previous section). By using this we
learn the state transition probabilities (π ) and evaluate how certain
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tactical actions will affect this and therefore learn the action payoff
values. This would allow teams to make in-match decisions that
can boost the chances of staying in a positive state or moving into a
more positive state by scoring a goal. An example of this problem is
shown in Figure 2. We next detail how we learn the state transition
probabilities, action payoffs and optimisation.
5.1 Learning the State Transition Probabilities
Prior work by Dixon and Robinson [10] models how the rate of
scoring goals changes over the course of a match. Their model
incorporates parameters for both the attacking and the defensive
strength of a team, home advantage, the current score and the time
left to play. They show how the scoring rate tends to increase over
the game but is also influenced by the current score. They then
use their model to find the probability that the game will end in a
given state which can be used for match outcome prediction and
goal-time prediction. We take inspiration from the model presented
by Dixon and Robinson to learn the state transition probabilities
(π ) that we need to use in our stochastic game.
To learn our state transition probabilities we build a new model
at each game-state that will give the probability of each of the
possible outcomes from that state (home goal, away goal, no goals).
We use a feature set made up from the team strength and the teams’
formation and style taken from the Bayesian game (in this game we
know our oppositions tactics and style but not the in-match actions
they may take). For our model (ϕ) we use the SVM classification
model (with an RBF kernel) described in Section 4.1 and Equation 7.
Also, π is the transition probability of moving from state Sx to state
Sy and F is the feature set. This means πx,y = p(Sx → Sy ) = ϕx (F )
giving a prediction model for each of the possible states x the game
could be in.
5.2 Learning the Action Payoffs
We build on the models that we discussed in the previous section
to include new features into the feature set F to help us model
the effect of in-match decisions such as substitutes. The first new
feature we use is a measure of a new player’s contribution to the
teamwhich represents the impact of a new substitution on the pitch.
This allows us to calculate the payoff of the action (substitute) so
that we can make an optimised decision at a given point in the
game. To calculate the contribution of the players on the bench we
use the centrality metric that is discussed in [3]. This metric gives
the importance of a player to the overall team network. We also
use the remaining match time as a feature so we can see how long
an action has to make an impact on the game. These new features
are used to update Equation 7. The payoff of each action is the
transition probability of moving to a more positive state (e.g., if
a team is winning 1-0 it is the probability of making it 2-0 or if a
team is losing 3-0 it is the probability of making the game 3-1).
5.3 Optimising In-Match Tactics
Assuming the standard rules of football, each team can make up to 3
substitutions in a game (these can be one at a time or all at once) and
has 7 players to choose from, meaning there are 64 combinations
of actions (including doing nothing) that we can take at each game-
state. We pre-compute the payoffs for each of these possibilities
and then select the optimised action to take. Depending on if the
team wants to remain in or move to a better state, we can optimise
the actions by using two different approaches:
• Aggressive approach: Choose the action that maximises
the probability of moving to a more positive state.
• Reserved approach: Choose the action that maximises the
chances of staying in the current state (if winning).
In the next section, we test our learning and optimisation ap-
proaches for both the Bayesian and stochastic game discussed in
the prior sections.
6 EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
To evaluate our models we use a dataset collected from two seasons
(2017/18 and 2018/19) from the English Premier League (EPL).6
The dataset breaks down each of the games from the tournament
into an event-by-event analysis where each event gives different
metrics including: event type (e.g., pass, shot, tackle etc.), the pitch
coordinates of the event and the event outcome. This type of dataset
is industry-leading in football and used by top professional teams.
Thus, this is a rich real-world dataset that allows us to rigorously
assess the value of our model. The experiments7 performed are as
follows:
6.1 Experiment 1: Testing the Opposition
Action Prediction
In our first test, we aim to evaluate the performance of the style
clustering methods and the team formation prediction. This allows
us to accurately predict the tactics of opposition and therefore
optimise ours around this.
To select the number of clusters that we use in our testing we
use an elbow approach to find the point where the within-cluster
sum of squared errors (SSE) will decrease and find that 4 clusters
are the best to use. We show in Figure 3 how the teams were split
into their clusters (based on the 2017/18 season using two of the
features for the axis). This gives a view of how the team styles
within the league correspond to performance. The triangle shows
how Manchester City were far beyond any other team that season
and therefore are shown as their own cluster.
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Figure 3: 2017/18 EPL Team Style Clusters.
We next test our opposition formation prediction model as dis-
cussed in Section 4.1. Using features taken from the prior 5 games
against teams in the same style cluster to ourselves we predict team
6All data provided by StatsBomb - www.statsbomb.com.
7Tests have been run using Scikit-Learn and TensorFlow.
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formation.When testing the model we predict the correct formation
with an accuracy of 96.21% (tested on using a train-test split of 70%
to 30% with a cross-validation approach for 10 folds). The model
achieved a precision score of 0.9867, recall score of 0.9135 and an F1
score of 0.9441. There were a total of 30 different formations used
across the season with the most popular formation being ‘4-2-3-1’
used 21% of the time.
6.2 Experiment 2: Learning the Payoffs
Using the methods discussed in Section 4, we build a deep learning
model8 that takes the actions of the teams and the team strengths
into account, the model then assigns a probability (which is used
as part of the payoff) to the predicted outcome of the game (home
win, draw, away win). We test the outcome probability model by
evaluating the accuracy of the model for predicting games in the
EPL from the past 2 seasons and comparing our results to those from
a well-known football prediction algorithm presented by Dixon
and Coles in [9]. The results from this testing are shown in Figure
4 (tested on using a train-test split of 70% to 30% with a cross-
validation approach for 5 folds).
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Figure 4: Payoff Model Performance Comparison.
This shows that by having extra information regarding the team
formation and style clusters we predict the outcomemore accurately
and therefore produce better payoffs which are used to optimise
our actions in the Bayesian game.
6.3 Experiment 3: Pre-Match Optimisation
To test the pre-match Bayesian game we iterate through all games
in our dataset (760 games) across the two EPL seasons and find
the optimised tactics using the 3 different optimisation approaches
discussed in Section 3.1.
By calculating the optimised tactics we can compare our ap-
proaches and validate our models using real-world data by focusing
on a number of metrics. Firstly, we look at how “close” our optimised
tactics are to what was selected for the real-world game. We define
“closeness” as a formation that is equal to our recommendation or is
only 1 change away (e.g., 4-4-2 is close to 4-5-1 as you can move a
striker to midfield to give the “close” formation). Using this metric
we evaluate the optimisation methods for tactic recommendations
and find that the best response method has a closeness of 35.3%,
the spiteful approach has a closeness of 59.7% and the minmax
approach is at 44.6%. This shows that the spiteful approach is the
closest representation to real-world selections. However, when this
is split into home and away (50% and 69%) tactics we see that this
8We use a fully-connected feed forward NNwith 3 layers & a ReLU activation function.
number is skewed by the number of teams that aim to minimise
the chances of losing (using the spiteful approach) in away games,
this is expanded on in Section 7.
We next look at how the team performed in the real-world when
the selected tactics were “close” to our recommendation. In Figure
5 we show how the results of teams who use our recommendation
in terms of the win, draw and loss percentage. This shows that
when teams take the minmax approach they are more likely to win
a game in comparison to the other approaches (0.2% more than
the best response approach). Although their results are similar, in
comparison to the best response, minmax boosts the chance of a
draw by 1.1% and reduces the chance of a loss by 1.2%.
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Figure 5: Percentage of Real-World Results with Close Tactic Selec-
tion.
Finally, we assess the difference between the payoff of the rec-
ommended tactics and the actual tactics used across all 760 games.
We find that by taking the best response approach this boosts a
teams probability of winning on average by 16.1% and the minmax
approach boosts by 12.7%, while the spiteful approach reduces the
chances of losing a game by 1.4%. This shows that, as expected, the
best response gives the biggest boost to the probability of winning
a game, although the minmax approach achieves similar results
while also reducing the chances of losing the game. Therefore, the
minmax approach would be the best option a team should take in
most occasions (depending on the factors of the specific game).
6.4 Experiment 4: Predicting State Transitions
To test the accuracy of the state transition models (one for each
game-state) discussed in Section 5, we compare the model output
(home goal, away goal or no goals) to the real-world outcome. We
use a train-test split of 70% to 30% with a cross-validation approach
for 10 folds. We assess each of the models separately using this
approach and on average achieve an accuracy of 87.5% (with a
standard deviation of 4.8%), the detailed results for each of the
different states are shown in Figure 6.9
This shows how our models effectively learn the state transition
probabilities to a high accuracy at each state. The lower scoreline
states have more data points over the last two EPL seasons which
we use to train and test the models. Therefore, we have a higher
certainty over these state transition models in comparison to the
ones trained for the higher scorelines that rarely occur in the real-
world (more than 6 goals in a match), hence they are not shown in
Figure 6 but are available to use in our next experiment.
9This has been limited to 3-3 due to the smaller sample sizes of larger scorelines.
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Figure 6: Heatmap of State-Transition Model Accuracy.
6.5 Experiment 5: In-Game Optimisation
When testing the decisions made using the methods from Section
5.3 we iterate through all games in our dataset (760 games) across
the two EPL seasons, calculating the payoffs of the actions that
both teams can take at each game-state. We compare how often
teams took our optimised action in the real world (based on the two
different approaches suggested) and if not, evaluate how much our
action suggestion would have boosted the team’s in-game chances
of moving to a more positive state and to win the game.10
We first test the action payoff model discussed in Section 5.2
which uses the state transition probability, substitution and the
time of the game to calculate the payoff of the given substitute. By
so doing, our model (tested in the previous subsection) predicts the
next state with an average accuracy is 95.5% (standard deviation
of 4.5%), again tested using a train-test split of 70% to 30% with a
cross-validation approach for 10 fold.
When comparing our action recommendations to those that
were taken by the managers in the real-world, we find that the
aggressive approach makes the same decision 14.75% of the time
and the reserved approach makes the same decision 14.11% of the
time. If we look at teams making similar player substitutions to our
recommendation (selecting a player who plays in the same position
as our recommended substitution) then these increase to 40.10%
and 39.75% respectively. In Figure 7, we show the average payoff for
each substitute comparing the real world and our two approaches.
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Figure 7: Payoffs of Real-World vs. Optimised Decisions
On average our more aggressive approach boosts winning pay-
offs by 2.0% and the more reserved approach reduces the opponents
winning payoff by 3.4%. This shows that the changes in tactics that
are made in a game can have an impact on the overall outcome and
help teams to move into more positive states or stay in the current
state if a team is winning a game. By using the stochastic game
payoffs we can optimise the efficiency of these decisions by 3.4%
10We do not have data for the players that are included as substitutes so we consider
all squad players (instead of just the 7 substitutes) which impacts our accuracy.
which could have a significant difference to a team across a season
in a game such as football, where every marginal gain counts.
7 DISCUSSION
One key observation from our testing is how attitude differs be-
tween home and away teams. In terms of “closeness”, the most
accurate actions for away teams tactics are given by the spiteful
approach; 69% in comparison to 33% and 32% for the best response
and minmax respectively. This shows that away teams are more
likely to select tactics that minimise the chances of the opposition
winning rather than trying to maximise their chances of winning
the game. By comparison, the closeness accuracies for home teams
are 38% for best response, 50% for spiteful and 53%minmax showing
an increase in the number of teams that aim to win a game. This is
expected as there is an advantage of playing at home, therefore they
chose to minimise their risk of losing. Overall, teams can increase
their chances of winning by up to 16.1% (p-value of 0.0001).
We also see that when using the spiteful approach (which aims
to minimise the risk of losing a game), there is a drop in the chances
of a team drawing a match and it increases the chances of losing
the match in comparison to the other approaches (shown in Figure
5). The key reason for this is likely due to that when teams aim to
avoid losing and pick a more defensive approach, this allows the
opposition to attack more and have more chances to win the game.
It also suggests that if a team selects this approach they do not
believe they can win a game, as they may be playing an opposition
with better players and a higher chance of winning regardless of
the selected tactic.
Testing the stochastic game is more challenging due to a lack
of data for available substitutes. There is also greater uncertainty
regarding the state transitions probabilities. However, we show
that by using our modelling approach teams could increase their
chances of moving into (or staying in) a more positive state by up
to 3.4% (p-value of 0.0004).
8 CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents a novel model for making both pre-match and
in-match decisions for football; and as such provides a natural
framework to conduct learning in. For the pre-match Bayesian
game setting, we find that we can effectively predict the style and
actions of the opposition and then present threemodels for selecting
optimised actions in response. We find that a minmax approach
would be the best to take, however in the real-world teams tend to
go for a spiteful approach. Overall, the Bayesian game model could
be useful to help real-world teams make effective decisions to win
a game and the stochastic game can help coaches/managers make
optimised changes during the 90 minutes of a match. In future work,
we would break down football and its state to learn more about
how the game develops. We could explore similar approaches to
the reinforcement learning methods used in AlphaGo [22] to gain
a deeper understanding of the in-game dynamics.
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